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Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union:   





In February 2012, the European Parliament broke new legal ground when it adopted a 
revolutionary new resolution aimed at establishing a coherent European approach to cross-border 
collective redress.  After years spent resisting any sort of mechanism that resembled U.S.-style 
class actions, the E.U. is now set to develop a unique form of regional collective relief that will 
offer European plaintiffs a range of previously unexplored legal opportunities.  However, this 
new procedure will also give rise to a variety of entirely unprecedented challenges.   
This Article considers the various issues associated with the creation of a system of 
collective relief in a region that has traditionally been hostile to the provision of large-scale 
private litigation.  In so doing, the discussion focuses on the clash between certain constitutional 
rights relating to the ability of the plaintiff to choose the time, place and manner of bringing suit 
and the European Union’s primary form of legislation concerning cross-border procedure, 
Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of civil and 
commercial judgments, commonly known as the Brussels I Regulation. 
Although this analysis is set within the confines of European Union law, it sheds new 
light on the U.S. class action debate by unbundling certain procedural rights held by the parties.  
Furthermore, many of the issues discussed in the Article may soon be directly relevant to U.S. 
parties if a number of proposed revisions to the Brussels I Regulation are enacted as expected. 
Interest in international class and collective relief has never been higher among corporate, 
commercial, consumer and antitrust lawyers.  This Article provides important insights into key 
European issues that give rise to significant ramifications for U.S. interests. 
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At one point, the United States was the only jurisdiction in the world to offer private relief for 
large-scale legal injuries, primarily, though not exclusively, in the form of the class action.
1
  
Although class actions have been severely criticized in the United States and elsewhere for much 
of their nearly fifty-year lifespan, the concept of collective redress has spread beyond U.S. 
borders and is now a fixture in numerous countries, including those in both the common and civil 
law traditions.
2
   
Nowhere has this shift to private relief been more remarkable than in the European 
Union, where the comprehensive nature of the European regulatory regime once made private 
forms of collective relief appear both unnecessary and unlikely.
3
  However, sixteen of the 
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1
 See 28 U.S.C. §1407 (2012); FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class 
Actions:  An Overview, in 622 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 7, 8 (Deborah Hensler et al. eds, 2009) [hereinafter The Annals].   
2
 See The Annals, supra note 1; see also Global Class Actions Exchange, available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/.  Individual procedures can vary radically.  In addition to U.S.-style 
representative relief, which is marked by its use of a trans-substantive, opt-out mechanism that can be 
triggered by a single individual acting as a lead plaintiff, nations have adopted forms of collective relief 
that include other types of representative relief (including relief that is available only on an opt-in basis, 
only with respect to certain substantive areas of law, only with respect to injunctive relief and/or only at 
the instigation of an approved intermediary entity such as a government association or non-government 
organization), aggregate relief and settlement-only relief.  See Hensler, supra note 1, at 13-17.   
3
 The development of private forms of collective relief in Europe has been much commented-upon.  See 
John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action Settlement, 46 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 134 (1997); Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress Procedures – European 
Debates, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 379, 380 (2009); Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in Europe:  
The New Model, 29 CIVIL JUST. Q. 370, 370 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will 
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe? 52 VAND. L. REV. 179, 181 (2009); Tanya J. Monestier, 
Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (2011); 
Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States:  A Legal and 
Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 409, 426-27 (2009) [hereinafter Mulheron, Opt-Out]; Rachael 
3 
 
twenty-seven  European Member States currently offer some form of large-scale private relief at 
the national level,
4
 while European law offers collective redress to residents of all Member States 
in a select number of subject matter areas, including consumer, competition, intellectual property 
and environmental law as well as in cases involving injunctive relief.
5
   
Therefore, collective redress can now be considered a reality within the European Union.
6
  
However, the patchwork nature of regional legislation and the inconsistent availability and 
nature of national forms of collective relief have raised questions as to whether the current state 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Action Reform in England:  A Critique and A Proposal, 127 L.Q. 
REV. 288, 289 (2011); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of 
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (2009); Francesco Rizzuto, Does the European 
Community Have Legal Competence to Harmonise National Procedural Rules Governing Private Actions 
for Damages From Infringements of European Community Antitrust Rules? 2 GLOBAL COMP. LIT. REV. 
29, 29-30 (2009); Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
141, 164-79 (2010); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union:  Fact or Fantasy? 
(forthcoming 2013); Gerhard Wagner, Collective Redress – Categories of Loss and Legislative Options, 
127 L.Q. REV. 55, 55 (2011). 
4
 See Directorate General for Internal Policies, Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU 
Member States, IP/A/IMCO/NT/2011-16, 5 (July 2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201107/20110715ATT24242/20110715ATT242
42EN.pdf; see also European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Recast), COM(2010) 748 Final, 2010/0383 (COD), Dec. 14, 2010, ¶3.1.1 [hereinafter Brussels I 
Recast]; The Annals, supra note 1; Jeremy Fleming, Joining Forces Across Europe, 87 EUR. LAW. 45, 45 
(2009) (citing thirteen nations in 2009).   
5
 See European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/35/EC of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage [2004] O.J. L143/56; European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer 
practices [2005] O.J. L149/22 (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive); European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2004/48 of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights  [2004] O.J. 
L195/16; European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/35/EC of 29 June 2000 on combating late 
payments in commercial transactions[2005] O.J. L200/35; European Parliament and Council Directive 
98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests [1998] O.J. L16/51; 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] O.J. L95/29; 
see also White Paper, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008)165 (2 April 
2008); Green Paper, Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008)794 (27 November 2008); European 
Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress,” P7_TA(2012)0021, ¶¶10-14 [hereinafter Resolution]; Christopher Hodges, European Union 
Legislation, in The Annals, supra note 1, at 78, 78-85.  
6
 See Hodges, supra note 5, at 78-85. 
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of affairs is hindering the proper operation of the internal market.
7
  These concerns led the 
European Commission to initiate a public consultation in February 2011 to help determine 
whether it was necessary, desirable and legally possible to create a coherent European approach 
to collective redress.
8
   
As a result of the consultation process, which generated over 19,000 submissions,
9
 and an 
own-initiative report,
10
 the European Parliament adopted a resolution (Resolution) on February 
2, 2012, calling on the European Council, the European Commission and the various Member 
States to work together towards creating a coherent European approach to cross-border collective 
redress.
11
  By limiting its efforts to cross-border collective actions, the European Parliament was 
able to focus on the European Union’s core concerns and legal competencies vis-à-vis the proper 
                                                          
7
 See Resolution, supra note 5,  ¶¶E-H, 6, 15. 
8
 See European Commission (EC), Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173, Feb. 4, 2011 [hereinafter Public Consultation].  In that document, the 
European Commission defined collective redress as: 
 
a broad concept encompassing any mechanism that may accomplish the cessation or 
prevention of unlawful business practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the 
compensation for the harm caused by such practices.  There are two main forms of 
collective redress: by way of injunctive relief, claimants seek to stop the continuation of 
illegal behaviour; by way of compensatory relief, they seek damages for the harm caused. 
 
Id. ¶7; see also Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, art. 37(3) (as amended) (including a somewhat 
different definition).   
9
 The number of submissions was high, but not unprecedented.  The submissions are available for public 
viewing.  See European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Public Consultation:  Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0054_en.htm (last visited April 3, 
2012). 
10
 See Committee on Legal Affairs Report, 12 January 2012, “Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress,” 2011/2089(INI). 
11
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶30. The European Commission is scheduled to address these issues in 
late 2012.  See European Commission, Commission Actions Expected to be Adopted 31/05/2012-
31/12/2012, at 5, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/docs/forward_programming_2012.pdf (indicating the European 
Commission intends to produce a communication on general principles of the EU framework for 
collective redress by the fourth quarter of 2012). 
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workings of the internal market, thus respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
reflected in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
12
 
In adopting the Resolution, the European Parliament is addressing a very real issue with 
significant financial and social ramifications.
13
  Not only are collective legal injuries of 
increasing importance in the region, but a rising number of collective actions within the 
European Union include a cross-border element.
14
  However, creating a coherent European-wide 
means of addressing these claims will not be easy, either in legal or political terms.
15
  One of the 
most difficult tasks will be to find a means of resolving certain inherent tensions between 
fundamental or constitutional principles of justice on the one hand and the European Union’s 
primary form of legislation concerning cross-border procedure, Council Regulation 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments, commonly 
known as the Brussels I Regulation, on the other.
16
  However, “the application of the Brussels I 
                                                          
12
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶¶M, 4, 6; Public Consultation, supra note 8, ¶14; see also Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union [2010] O.J. C83/01, art. 5 [hereinafter TFEU].  The TFEU 
amended and replaced the Treaty Establishing the European Community, one of the founding documents 
of the European Union.  See id.; see also Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2007] O.J. C306/01, art. 1, Dec. 17, 2007.  
13
 Unrecompensed collective injuries are valued at 0.4% of the European Union’s annual gross domestic 
product (GDP).  Furthermore, one in five European citizens will experience some sort of collective legal 
injury each year.  Seventy-nine percent of consumers in the European Union want some form of 
collective redress.  See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶D.   
14
 In 2008, nearly ten percent of all collective redress claims in Europe included some sort of cross-border 
element.  See Green Paper, Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008)794 ¶15 (27 November 2008).  
However, that percentage might be as high as forty percent according to a problem study report.  See 
Directorate General for Internal Policies, supra note 4, at 43.   
15
 See Gail Orton, When Lobbying DG COMP Makes Sense;  European Competition Officials are Policy-
Makers as Well as Regulators, 7 COMP. L. INT’L 50, 52 (2011). 
16
 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter 




Regulation with regard to collective redress proceedings has so far been largely overlooked by 
the policymakers and English legal literature.”17   
The interplay between constitutional or fundamental rights and the Brussels I Regulation 
gives rise to a number of potential problems, many of them quite complicated.
18
  Although these 
concerns may appear to be relevant only to European parties, certain proposed revisions to the 
Brussels I Regulation would make much of this analysis equally applicable to parties involved in 
internationally oriented class actions based in the United States.
19
  Furthermore, the type of 
deconstructionist constitutional analysis conducted herein may be applicable by analogy to some 
of the class-action debates currently underway in the United States.
20
 
Given the complexity of this area of law, it is impossible to consider all the various issues 
simultaneously.  Therefore, this Article will consider the matter from only one perspective, that 
                                                          
17
 Mihail Danov, The Brussels I Regulation:  Cross-Border Collective Redress Proceedings and 
Judgments, 5 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 359, 360 (2010) [hereinafter Danov, Brussels I] (citations omitted).  But 
see Burkhard Hess, Cross-border Collective Litigation and the Regulation Brussels I, 2 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS (IPRAX) 54 (2010); Horatia Muir Watt, Brussels I 
and Aggregate Litigation, 2 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS (IPRAX) 
111 (2010). 
18
 See Peter Barnett, The Prevention of Abusive Cross-Border Re-Litigation, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 943, 
957 (2002); Fairgrieve & Howells, supra note 3, at 380; Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress in 
Europe:  The New Model, 29 CIVIL JUST. Q. 370, 370 (2010); Mulheron, Opt-Out, supra note 3, at 426-
27; Monestier, supra note 3, at 44-45; Rizzuto, supra note 3, at 29-30; S.I. Strong, Cross-Border 
Collective Redress and Individual Participatory Rights:  Quo Vadis? under consideration by AM. J. 
COMP. L. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Quo Vadis]; Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class 
Actions and Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 332-69 (2011). 
19
 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.  These particular revisions are likely to be adopted, 
unlike certain other proposals which are much more controversial.  See infra notes 84 and accompanying 
text. 
20
 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.  For example, one of the major issues currently under 
discussion in the United States involves the ability of a party to waive the right to proceed as a class.  See 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).  This issue turns largely on the nature of the 
right to proceed as a class.  See S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: 
The United States and Canada Compared, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 921 (2012) [hereinafter 
Strong, Canada].  The current discussion could add much to that debate, since the analysis contained 
herein unbundles some of the procedural rights associated with collective relief in an entirely novel 
manner.  See also Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
7 
 
of individual plaintiffs who wish to proceed with their claims outside the collective context.
21
  In 
so doing, the discussion not only identifies problems facing litigants under existing laws, it also 
considers various means of improving the current regime as well a number of proposed changes 
to the Brussels I framework that could affect cross-border collective relief both inside and 
outside the European Union.
22
  The emphasis of the analysis is not only critically important 
given the European Parliament’s express pronouncements about the deference to be given to the 
plaintiff’s right to individual relief,23 it addresses certain issues that are often overlooked in both 
the United States and Europe.
24
 
The structure of the Article is as follows.  First, Section II outlines the legal framework 
for the individual rights in question, based on various constitutional and fundamental principles 
of law.  Next, Section III introduces the Brussels I Regulation and describes the ways in which 
the Regulation conflicts with the constitutional and fundamental rights of individual plaintiffs.
25
  
Finally, Section IV discusses the impact of the proposed changes to the Brussels I Regulation 





II. Plaintiffs’ Individual Constitutional and Fundamental Rights Relating to Collective  
 Redress 
                                                          
21
 Empirical studies have not calculated how often plaintiffs opt out of U.S. class actions and to what 
effect, although researchers have indicated it would be “interesting” to study that issue.  See THOMAS E. 
WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:  FINAL 
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 79 (1996).   
22
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; Brussels I Recast, supra note 4.   
23
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27. 
24
 Although the concept of individual participatory rights in U.S. class actions has not been widely 
explored, given the longstanding belief that class counsel effectively controls the shape of the 
proceedings, an analytical shift seems to be taking place.  See infra notes 97, 148 and accompanying text. 
25
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16. 
26
 See id. 
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Traditionally, European procedural law has been considered “sub-constitutional,” in sharp 
contrast to the approach adopted in the United States.
27
  However, there appears to be a trend 
among some European courts and commentators to begin viewing certain procedural issues from 
a constitutional or fundamental human rights perspective.
28
   
Procedural rights exist at both the European and Member State level.
29
  Thus, for 
example, article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter)
30
 
states in relevant part that: 
[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with 
the conditions laid down in this Article.  Everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 




This provision is obviously important to parties involved in large-scale legal actions, 
although the procedures used to provide an “effective remedy” may not be the same in a 
                                                          
27
 See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1009 (2006). 
28
 See Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A 
GLOBALIZING WORLD 159, 169-72 (X.E. Kramer & C.H. van Rhee eds., 2012); see also Mauro 
Cappelletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation:  Comparative Constitutional, 
International and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651 (1973).  But see J.J. Fawcett, The Impact of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 33 (2007) (suggesting 
courts have tended to downplay the interplay between constitutional or other fundamental rights and the 
Brussels I Regulation).  An interesting analysis involves the interplay between general principles of 
adjudicative fairness and enumerated procedural rights.  See David M. Siegel, Canadian Fundamental 
Justice and U.S. Due Process:  Two Models for a Guarantee of Basic Adjudicative Fairness, 37 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 5-11 (2005). 
29
 See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 457, 458 
(2000). 
30
 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/C 364/1, Dec. 18, 2000 [hereinafter 
Charter]; Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel, Judge-Made Standards of National Procedure in the Post-Lisbon 
Constitutional Framework, 37 EUR. L. REV. 90, 94-95 (2012).   
31
 Charter, supra note 30, art. 47. 
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collective dispute as in a bilateral one.
32
  Indeed, in some cases, a collective redress mechanism 
may be the only means by which an effective remedy can be provided.
33
   
At this point, it is impossible to say precisely what is meant by the Charter in this 
particular context, since there is no case law construing the term “an effective remedy” in the 
context of a collective suit.
34
  Indeed, there are not many judicial decisions considering any 
aspect of the Charter at either the European or national levels, since the Charter existed in a sort 
of legal limbo from 2000, its initial adoption date, until 2007, when the Lisbon Treaty gave the 
Charter legal force and brought it into the European constitutional framework.
35
  However, it is 
likely that procedural rights guaranteed under the Charter will become increasingly relevant to 
the development of law in this field, given that national provisions of law are subject to 








 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶F; Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The 
aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the 
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.  Where it is not economically 
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for 
damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-
action device.”); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility dated August 4, 2011, ¶545, available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf.   
34
 Charter, supra note 30, art. 47. 
35
 See David Anderson & Cian C. Murphy, The Charter of Fundamental Rights, in E.U. LAW AFTER 
LISBON *1 (Andrea Biondi et al., eds., 2012); see also id. at *7 (discussing fundamental nature of Charter 
rights). 
36
 See TFEU, supra note 12, art. 19(1); Cleynenbreugel, supra note 30, at 95; see also Anderson & 
Murphy, supra note 35, at 8-20 (discussing the extent to which the Charter and European Convention on 
Human Rights can be relied upon in individual litigation).  However, this view is not universally held, 
with some courts suggesting a limited role for the Charter in the protection of individual rights.  See ZZ v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] EWCA Civ. 440 ¶16. 
10 
 
Of course, the rights guaranteed under the Charter are not absolute.
37
  Instead, 
most – including the procedural rights subsumed within article 47 – are subject to the 
balancing test outlined in article 52(1), which states that: 
[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms.  Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 




Again, this test has seldom been judicially discussed due to the unique procedural posture 
of the Charter.
39
  Nevertheless, article 52(1) usefully identifies the various factors that are 
relevant to a balancing analysis under European law, even though the Charter does not make any 
suggestion as to the relative weight of the individual criteria.
40
   
Balancing tests are always difficult to implement, particularly when both individual and 
public interests are at stake.  Indeed, a number of commentators have taken the view that it is 
impossible to balance individual rights against the interests of the state,
41
 typically because the 
elements on either side of the equation are said to be inherently incommensurable.
42
  However, 
                                                          
37
 See Charter, supra note 30. 
38
 Id. art. 52(1). 
39
 See id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.  However, it appears that in order to rely on the 
balancing test under article 52(1), there first must be a relevant right existing at national law.  See McB v. 
E, Case C-400/10PPU, [2011] Fam. 364, ¶52 (ECJ, Oct. 5, 2010); see also ZZ v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2011] EWCA Civ. 440 ¶16 (noting that the Charter may not create any new 
substantive rights).  That right would exist in the case of individual participatory rights.  See infra note 64 
and accompanying text. 
40
 See Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1). 
41
 This claim is made in various areas of constitutional law.  See J. Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free 
Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 331 (1969); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion:  An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 G.W. L. REV. 685, 736 (1992); Roscoe Pound 
(1943), A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1943); Robin West, Progressive and 
Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 697 (1990).   
42
 See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious 
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46, 51 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1748 (1995). 
11 
 
this is not to say that a balancing analysis cannot take place; indeed, it often must, as a practical 
matter.
43
   
Cass Sunstein’s approach to incommensurability and valuation in law may be useful here, 
since he recognizes the problems associated with weighing very different goods or interests.
44
  
Despite these differences, Sunstein believes that “choices can be made among incommensurable 
goods, and that such choices are subject to reasoned evaluation.”45  In making such choices, he 
suggests that “it is desirable to have a highly disaggregated picture of the consequences of legal 
rules, a picture that enables the judge to see the various goods at stake.”46  He would then place 
each situation into context, since he believes that decisions concerning incommensurable goods 
cannot be made in the abstract.
47
   
The concept of deconstructing the various rights at issue is particularly useful in the 
realm of collective claims, since it helps identify whether the real issue is an item of fundamental 
or constitutional importance or whether it is merely an interest or policy.
48
  Therefore, the 
analytical approach adopted this Article involves breaking apart the constituent elements of any 
particular rights claim so as to understand and subsequently weigh what is truly involved.
49
  This 
analysis occurs in the context of a real-world discussion replicating the way that that the rights 
analysis will play out in practice.
50
  Furthermore, this Article takes the view that the best way to 
                                                          
43
 See Le Sueur, supra note 29, at 473; Sunstein, supra note 42, at 1735-36; see also infra note 145 and 
accompanying text. 
44
 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 81 (1997). 
45
 Id.; see also Virgílio Afonso da Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable:  Constitutional Principles, 
Balancing and Rational Decision, 31 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 273, 301 (2011). 
46
 SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 99. 
47
 See id. at 101.  This approach is consistent with analysts who propose using scenarios to guide the 
development of international legal theory and practice.  See William J. Aceves, Predicting Chaos?  Using 
Scenarios to Inform Theory and Guide Practice, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 607-09 (2005). 
48
 See Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1). 
49
 See infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text. 
50
 See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
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balance the rights and interests at stake in any conflict is to compare similarly weighted factors – 
i.e., rights to rights – whenever possible, and to compare dissimilarly weighted factors – i.e., 
rights to “objectives of general interest” – only as a second-best technique.51   
Although the Charter is an important source of fundamental rights under European law, 
there are other authorities available.  One well-known and frequently used authority is the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
52
  Here, the relevant provisions are found in 
article 6(1), which reads, in part, that “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . 
. , everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.”53  Article 13 contains a related right, stating that 
“[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”54   
Article 6(1) has generated an extremely large amount of case law
55
 due, in part, to the 
fact that the provision’s relatively general language encompasses a wide range of subsidiary 
protections, including access to justice, the right to a fair hearing and a number of other 
litigation-oriented rights.
56
  While the various judicial decisions are useful in suggesting the type 
of elements that make up the right to a fair trial, the relatively novel nature of cross-border 
                                                          
51
 See Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1). 
52
 European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by protocols nos. 11 and 14, effective 1 June 2010 
[hereinafter ECHR], available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/CONVENTION_ENG_WEB.pdf; Cleynenbreugel, supra note 30, at 95-96.   
53
 ECHR, supra note 52, art. 6(1).  For an analysis of article 6(1) in the context of opt-out collective 
actions, see Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 378-80. 
54
 Id. art. 13. 
55
 Article 6(1) is cited in 7139 cases heard by the European Court of Human Rights.  See ECHR, supra 
note 52, art. 6(1); European Court of Human Rights, Case Law Database [hereinafter ECHR Database], 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (searching under article “6-1”) 
(site last visited March 30, 2012).   
56
 See ECHR Database, supra note 55 (expanding the keyword search under article 6).  The claim of 
access to justice and the right of a fair trial both have several constituent elements.  See Le Sueur, supra 
note 29, at 459-62. 
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collective relief in Europe means that none of these decisions have yet considered an article 6 
challenge in the context of collective redress.
57
  Nevertheless, certain principles apply by analogy 
and may be relied upon in domestic courts pursuant to article 19(1) of the TEFU and various 
provisions of national law.
58
 
The standards identified by the Charter and the ECHR are very important to the inquiry 
being carried out in this Article, since much of the analysis revolves around the proper 
interpretation and application of a key piece of European legislation, namely the Brussels I 
Regulation.
59
  However, European law is not the only source of legal rights available to parties 
residing in the European Union.
60
  Indeed, most plaintiffs interested in protecting their 
procedural rights in cases involving cross-border collective relief are more likely to rely on 
constitutional provisions that exist as a matter of national law.
61
  The most relevant principles for 
                                                          
57
 Notably, any case law arising under the ECHR should apply to the Charter is roughly equal measure, 
since significant efforts were made to ensure that the Charter is interpreted in a manner consistent with 
the ECHR.  See Anderson & Murphy, supra note 35, at 7 (noting also that Charter rights may in some 
cases be more extensive than those under the ECHR). One court that has recently addressed collective 
redress in the pan-European context is the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which is enabled to rule on 
certain collective settlements pursuant to the Dutch Act on Collective Settlements of 2005 (WCAM). See 
Act on Collective Settlements 2005; Scor Holding (Switzerland) AG v. Liechtensteinische Landesbank 
AG, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 17 Jan 2012 (often referring to the settlement itself as SCOR Holding 
(Switzerland) AG/Zurich Fin. Serv. Ltd. Stichting Converium Sec. Compensation Found./Vereniging 
VEBNCVB)), informal English version available at 
http://www.converiumsettlement.com/images/stories/documents/Decision%2017%20January%202012.pd
f; Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsigh Scheurleer,  The Netherlands, in The Annals, supra note 1, at 149, 
153-55.   
58
 See TFEU, supra note 12, art. 19(1); Human Rights Act 1998 (Eng.), arts. 1, 4, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents; Cleynenbreugel, supra note 30, at 95; see also 
Anderson & Murphy, supra note 35, at 8-20 (discussing the extent to which the Charter and ECHR can be 
relied upon in individual litigation). 
59
 See Charter, supra note 30, art. 47 (referring to an effective remedy for violation of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under E.U. law); ECHR, supra note 52, art. 6(1); Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16. 
60
 See TFEU, supra note 12, art. 5.   
61
 National law – including constitutional law – remains of vital importance within the European Union, 
pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity.  See id.   
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the purposes of this Article involve what may be called “individual participatory rights,” which 
are best illustrated by certain debates relating to the opt-out representative actions.
62
  
The essence of the plaintiff’s individual participatory right in the context of a collective 
dispute involves the ability to choose whether, when and where to bring a legal claim,
63
 which in 
some European Member States rises to the level of a fundamental constitutional concern.
64
  In 
these jurisdictions, opt-out approaches to collective redress are constitutionally suspect because 
they allow binding adjudication of individual rights without sufficient evidence of individual 
                                                          
62
 Individual participatory rights can arise in the context of representative, aggregative and settlement-
only relief, albeit in slightly different manners.  See Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., [1990] 2 Q.B. 338, 
348-49 (C.A.) (Eng.) (involving individual participatory rights in the context of a test case); Strong, Quo 
Vadis, supra note 18 (discussing defendants’ and plaintiffs’ individual participatory rights); Wasserman, 
supra note 18, at 340-41; see infra note 134.  Furthermore, individual participatory rights can be put into 
issue in settlement-only forms of collective relief, particularly those in the Netherlands, which has created 
an innovative form of large-scale opt-out relief as a result of the Collective Settlements Act 2005.  See 
Tzankova & Scheurleer, supra note 57, at 149.  (Notably, the Netherlands is currently considering certain 
proposals to expand its collective redress scheme beyond settlements only.)  However, to the extent that 
issues involving individual participatory rights arise in the context of aggregative and settlement-only 
relief, the issues are essentially the same as in representative actions.  Therefore, this Article will focus 
only on the latter for ease of discussion, except where noted.  
63
 There may be a fourth element, the right to choose the means of litigating one’s rights.  See Strong, Quo 
Vadis, supra note 18; see also infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, each of these 
constituent elements may not be given equal weight.  See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text. 
64
 See In re Vivendi Universal, No. 02 Civ. 5571, 2009 WL 855799, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) 
(noting the defendant argued that the U.S. court could not assume jurisdiction over French class members 
because a French court would hold class actions to be unconstitutional); Monestier, supra note 3, at 38-39 
(discussing French, German and Swedish law); see also infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text 
(suggesting a fourth possible element relating to the manner of suit).  In some states, this right is framed 
as a matter of public policy rather than as a constitutional issue.  However, even that lower level of 
protection is still problematic, since Member States are allowed to refuse to recognize or enforce a 
judgment from another Member State on the basis of public policy.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 
16, 34(1); see also infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.  However, discussions about public policy 
give rise to questions about whether there is – or should be – a distinction between transnational (also 
known as international) public policy and domestic public policy in matters of international enforcement.  
See Adeline Chong, Transnational Public Policy in Civil and Commercial Matters, 128 L.Q. REV. 88, 90 
(2012); Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 390; Jerca Kramberger Škeri, European Public Policy (With 
an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings), 7 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 461 (2011).  It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to consider the different ways that international and domestic public policy affect enforcement 
issues involving judicial forms of collective redress, although the author has considered that issue in the 
context of international class arbitration.  See S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International 





  The concern is that while the failure to opt out of the action may reflect a 
conscious decision on the part of the plaintiff to join the group action, it is also possible for 
certain people to become part of the class or collective unknowingly (because they did not 
receive adequate notice of the proceeding) or unwillingly (because they did not properly 
understand the opt-out process).
66
 
Although opt-out procedures are associated most closely with U.S. class actions,
67
 four 
European Member States (Denmark, Norway, Portugal and The Netherlands) have adopted 
domestic forms of collective redress that also provide some form of opt-out relief.
68
  While there 
is no doubt that these four countries are perfectly entitled to adopt opt-out provisions as a matter 




Although new twists could arise in the context of the proposed coherent European 
approach,
70
 the biggest problem has traditionally involved plaintiffs who did not opt out of the 
first action but who subsequently might wish to bring their own action in a second forum.
71
 If the 
court in the second state believes that the constitutional rights of the complaining parties have 
not been respected in the first proceeding because opt-out mechanisms do not provide plaintiffs 
with a suitable means of exercising their individual participatory rights, then the court will not 
                                                          
65
 Opt-out procedures of course purport to adjudicate the claims of certain represented persons unless 
those individuals affirmatively indicate that they do not want to be part of the plaintiff group.  See 
Rachael Mulheron, The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States Class Actions Judgment 
in England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi, 75 MODERN L. REV. 180, 181-82. 
66
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶20. 
67
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Hensler, supra note 1, at 16. 
68
 See Directorate General for Internal Policies, supra note 4, at 38; Henrique Sousa Antunes, Portugal, in 
The Annals, supra note 1, at 161, 165; Camilla Bernt, Norway, in The Annals, supra note 1, at 220, 226; 
Tzankova & Scheurleer, supra note 57, at 154; Eric Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, in The Annals, 
supra note 1, at 202, 204. 
69
 Provision of collective relief falls within the competence of the individual Member States.  See 
Resolution, supra note 5, ¶¶M, 3, 7. 
70
 See infra notes 80-215 and accompanying text. 
71
 See Monestier, supra note 3, at 7; Wasserman, supra note 18, at 379-80. 
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give the first judgment res judicata effect and will allow the second suit to be brought.
72
  This of 
course is highly problematic, since defendants value collective proceedings only to the extent 
that such actions can provide a judgment that has a preclusive effect against everyone who was 
part of the named collective.
73
   
Defendants in U.S. courts have relied on the fundamental unfairness associated with 
allowing foreign plaintiffs to use an adverse decision against the defendant without permitting 
the defendant to reap the rewards of a successful defense as a means of blocking the creation of 
international class actions.
74
  While defendants frame the issue as a defense right, the issue 




                                                          
72
 See Monestier, supra note 3, at 10-13, 31; Wasserman, supra note 18, at 380.  Although the issue 
would appear to arise at the enforcement stage, some courts in the North America consider these matters 
anticipatorily, when the decision is being made whether to allow the claim to progress on a group basis.  
This technique causes significant problems.  See Monestier, supra note 3, at 7; Strong, Canada, supra 
note 20; Wasserman, supra note 18, at 379-80.  In the United States and Canada, the determination would 
be made at the class certification stage, although the procedure will be different under the laws of the 
various European Member States, since collective redress in Europe does not resemble the U.S. class 
action.  See Monestier, supra note 3, at 7, 10-13, 31; Strong, Canada, supra note 20; Wasserman, supra 
note 18, at 379-80. 
73
 See Nagareda, supra note 3, at 13.  Notably, the Brussels I Regulation and European jurisprudence do 
not speak of a judgment having res judicata value, but instead focus on concepts of recognition and 
enforceability.  See Mihail Danov, EU Competition Law Enforcement:  Is Brussels I Suited to Dealing 
With All the Challenges? 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 27, 46 (2012) [hereinafter Danov, Competition Law]; 
Wasserman, supra note 18, at 332-69; see infra notes 75 and accompanying text.  However, parties 
seeking to establish the res judicata effect of a judgment from another Member State may be able to rely 
on principles of national law.  See Barnett, supra note 18, at 957. 
74
 See Monestier, supra note 3, at 31 (discussing lack of mutuality); see also George A. Bermann, U.S. 
Class Actions and the “Global” Class, 19 KAN. J. L & PUB. POL’Y 91, 98 (2009) (describing the “mirror 
image” criterion).  
75
 The essence of these defense rights include the right to rely on a previously and properly adjudicated 
judgment, i.e., the right to establish claim or issue preclusion. See Barnett, supra note 18, at 944; see also 
Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18.  This idea is subsumed within the notion of res judicata, which: 
 
encapsulates a principle inherent in all judicial systems, namely that an earlier 
adjudication is conclusive in a second suit involving the same subject-matter and same 
legal bases.  As such, the doctrine reflects two fundamental maxims of justice:  that no 
person should be proceeded against twice in respect of the same subject-matter, and that 
it is in the interest of the state that repetitious and wasteful re-litigation be avoided.  
17 
 
 The potential issues relating to the protection of individual participatory rights led the 
European Parliament to state in its February 2012 Resolution that any European-wide system of 
collective redress “must be founded on the opt-in principle.”76  While the European Parliament’s 
decision may have been based on politics and policy as much as a concern about individual 
participatory rights,
77
 the result is that any European system of cross-border collective redress 
will not include an opt-out element, consistent with the European intent not to adopt “a US-style 
class action system or any system which does not respect European legal traditions.”78  However, 
in removing the possibility of a European-wide opt-out action, the European Parliament did not 
eliminate all problems associated with individual participatory rights, as discussed in the next 
section.
79
   
 
III. Rights Versus Regulations – The Role of the Brussels I Regulation in Cross-Border 
Collective Redress 
One of the issues currently being considered in North American legal circles is whether the right 
to proceed as a class is substantive or procedural in nature.
80
  The European Parliament comes 
down clearly on the procedural side of the debate, stating that “access to justice by means of 
collective redress comes within the sphere of procedural law.”81  Thus, the Brussels I Regulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Barnett, supra note 18, at 944 (citations omitted). 
76
 Resolution, supra note 5, ¶20.   
77
 Some commentators have claimed that European authorities, including the European Court of Justice, 
are more concerned about upholding the Brussels I regime than about protecting human rights, including 
procedural rights of a constitutional and fundamental nature.  See Fawcett, supra note 28, at 16, 27 (citing 
Maronier v. Larmer, [2002] EWCA Civ. 774, [2003] Q.B. 620). 
78
 Resolution, supra note 5, ¶2. 
79
 See Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 392. 
80
 The issue typically arises in the context of the discussion about waivers of class relief.  See Strong, 
Canada, supra note 20. 
81
 Id. ¶15.  However, the distinction between procedure and substance is not always clear in other areas of 




“should be taken as a starting point for determining” issues relating to jurisdiction and 
enforcement of cross-border collective disputes.
82
   
In some ways, the European Parliament’s pronouncements make further analysis easy, 
since they indicate that all forms of inter-European collective redress must be evaluated in light 
of the Brussels I Regulation.
83
  However, as shall be seen, merely limiting the sources of relevant 
legal authority does not necessarily limit the nature or scope of issues to consider or the problems 
that can arise. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to consider whether it is worthwhile to focus on 
the current text of the Brussels I Regulation, given that the European Commission is in the 
process of revising that instrument.
84
  Indeed, collective redress is one of the issues specifically 
mentioned as being of concern in the revision process.
85
   
As it turns out, most of the amendments under discussion at the time of writing do not 
affect the analysis contained herein, not only because most of the proposals do not touch on 
those aspects of the Brussels I Regulation that are most problematic from the viewpoint of 
plaintiffs in collective disputes,
86
 but also because the European Commission is taking a very 
cautious approach towards collective disputes and is explicitly retaining certain key aspects of 
                                                          
82
 Resolution, supra note 5, ¶26; see also Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16.   
83
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16.   
84
 See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4.  The status of the revision process may be tracked at the Legislative 
Observatory, European Parliament, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2010/0383(COD).  
The process thus far has been highly contentious as a result of certain provisions regarding the interaction 
between the Brussels I Regulation and arbitration.  See Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Arbitration and the 
Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation:  Seeds of Home Country Control and of Harmonisation? 7 J. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 423 (2011).  
85
 See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, ¶2.   
86
 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
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the Brussels I Regulation in cases involving collective redress.
87
  Therefore, this Article will 
focus on the Brussels I Regulation as currently enacted, although some consideration will be 
given to the proposed revisions in section IV, which discusses a more rights-oriented approach to 
cross-border collective redress in Europe.
88
   
Notably, there is one aspect of the proposed revisions that bears immediate mention, 
since it is highly relevant to parties from the United States.  According to the European 
Commission, one of the aims of the new instrument is the “[e]xtension of the jurisdiction rules of 
the Regulation to disputes involving third country defendants, including regulating the situations 
where the same issue is pending before a court inside and outside the EU.”89  This is a significant 
development, since the Brussels I Regulation currently only applies when the defendant (or one 
of multiple necessary defendants) is domiciled in a European Member State.
90
  If this new 
approach is adopted (and there is no reason to believe it will not), it could result in many of the 




Having dispensed with the preliminaries, it is time now to turn to a substantive analysis 
of the Brussels I Regulation.
92
  The purpose of the Regulation is to facilitate inter-European 
litigation in two different ways:  first, by providing clear and predictable rules concerning which 
                                                          
87
 See id. ¶3.1.1 (noting requirements relating to exequatur of collective disputes will not be subject to 
revision); see also Škeri, supra note 64 (discussing importance of exequatur proceedings and effect of 
proposed revisions). 
88
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, ¶23 (as amended).   
89
 Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, ¶3.1; see also id. ¶¶1.2, 17 (as amended), art. 34 (as amended).    
90
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, ¶8, art. 6(1); Owusu v. Jackson, Case C-281/02, [2005] Eur. 
Ct. Rep. I-1381 (ECJ), [2005] Q.B. 801 (Eng.).     
91
 See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, art. 34 (as amended). 
92
 A detailed discussion of the general aspects of the Brussels I Regulation is beyond the scope of this 
Article, although additional reading is available.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; ADRIAN 
BRIGGS & PETER REES, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS (2009); Simona Grossi, Rethinking the 




national court has jurisdiction over any particular matter, thereby reducing parallel proceedings 
and increasing legal certainty, and second, by providing an easy and predictable means of 
recognizing and enforcing judgments from other Member States.
93
   
Although the Brussels I Regulation contemplates the possibility of some types of 
multiparty suits, the drafters did not design the instrument with large-scale collective actions in 
mind.
94
  As such, parties can experience substantial difficulties when attempting to apply the 
Brussels I Regulation to an inter-European collective action.
95
  Indeed, some plaintiffs could find 
their individual participatory rights effectively eviscerated.
96
  Not only is this a significant 




The following discussion mirrors the structure of the Brussels I Regulation by first 
considering issues relating to jurisdiction before moving on to concerns regarding enforcement.
98
   
                                                          
93
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, ¶¶11, 17.  Further reading on the proposed provisions is 
available.  See Richard Fentiman, Brussels I and Third States:  Future Imperfect? 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. 
EUR. LEGAL STUD. 65 (2010-11). 
94
 See id.; Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 364; Zheng Sophia Tang, Multiple Defendants in the 
European Jurisdiction Regulation, 34 EUR. L. REV. 80, 82-83 (2009). 
95
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 364. 
96
 See infra notes 198-210 and accompanying text. 
97
  Most analyses regarding the development of a European form of collective redress appear to have 
focused on ways of avoiding the problems inherent in U.S.-style class actions and therefore have focused 
on issues commonly discussed in U.S. commentary.  See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶¶2, 16, 20.  While 
protection of individual participatory rights has not traditionally been an issue that arises in the context of 
U.S.-style class actions, given the presumed constitutional propriety of opt-out actions, U.S. analysts 
suggest a change may be underway to take individual interests and preferences into account.  See MARTIN 
H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS 
ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (arguing that class actions are unconstitutional due to the way in which they 
encroach on liberal democratic autonomy values); John C. Massaro, The Emerging Federal Class Action 
Brand, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 667 (2011) (claiming the United States is “headed for a uniform 
federally-driven brand of class actions, and the expressly-stated purpose of this change is heightened 
protection of individual participatory rights”); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers:  A Comment on 
AT&T v. Concepcion, Walmart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 150-51 (2011); 
see also infra note 148. 
98
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16. 
21 
 
Although each item is addressed separately, there are areas of unavoidable overlap, since 
jurisdiction and enforcement are related concepts. 
 
A. Jurisdictional concerns relating to cross-border collective redress 
The European view of jurisdiction, as reflected in the Brussels I Regulation, is very different 
from that of the United States.
99
  Thus, for example: 
American law relies on broad standards of “fairness” and “reasonableness” that 
are applied in each individual case.  This enables the judge to focus on achieving 
justice in individual cases even if it hampers predictability for the parties.  
European law, by contrast, uses hard and fast rules that are easier to apply and 
therefore more predictable. . . .  In addition, U.S. law provides specific doctrines, 
such as forum non conveniens and antisuit injunctions, that give judges discretion 
to fine-tune and equilibrate  jurisdiction in individual cases.  European law is 
strongly opposed to both doctrines, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
recently made clear.  Instead, Europeans consider jurisdictional bases non-
discretionary, resolving the problem of parallel proceedings through a lis alibi 





Given this basic backdrop, it is unsurprising that the essential premise of the Brussels I 
Regulation is that jurisdiction is always proper in the defendant’s domicile.101  However, there 
are times when the Brussels I Regulation authorizes jurisdiction elsewhere, but only so long as 
there is a “close link between the court and the action or in order to facilitate the sound 
administration of justice.”102  Unlike the United States – which relies on the somewhat nebulous 
“minimum contacts” test of International Shoe and its progeny as a means of determining 
whether a particular court has personal jurisdiction – the Brussels I Regulation spells out each of 
the various heads of jurisdiction, which can range from special jurisdiction based on the type of 
                                                          
99
 See Michaels, supra note 27, at 1007, 1039-52. 
100
 Id. at 1008. 
101
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 2.   
102
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, ¶12.  For an analysis of the difficulties associated with 
jurisdiction in collective cases under various articles of the Brussels I Regulation, see Danov, Brussels I, 





 or jurisdiction based on the domicile of a co-defendant in any action involving 
several necessary co-defendants.
104
  The Brussels I regime also makes special provision for 
jurisdiction in cases involving certain vulnerable parties, such as consumers, employees or 
insureds, allowing suit to be brought in a number of other places, including the domicile or 
habitual place of employment of the plaintiff.
105
  Defendants may also consent to the jurisdiction 
of a particular court.
106
 
Therefore, although the Brussels I Regulation was meant to simplify questions of 
jurisdiction, it is clear that several courts may simultaneously have jurisdiction over any 
particular matter.
107
  Plaintiff are typically free to choose where they want to file suit, so long as 
the court has proper jurisdiction under the Regulation.
108
  While defendants cannot object to the 
                                                          
103
 For example, tort claims are amenable to suit where the harmful event occurred, while contract 
disputes may be brought in the place of performance.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note16, art. 5. 
104
 See id. art. 6(1); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (agreeing that the two-part test in International Shoe should be applied but failing to provide a 
clear description of whether minimum contacts requires the defendant to “purposefully direct” its conduct 
toward the forum); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (requiring exercise of 
jurisdiction to be reasonable); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 
(1984) (distinguishing between specific and general jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (noting that “‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient 
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause;” instead, courts must find “purposeful 
contacts” and the “reasonable” exercise of jurisdiction); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
316 (1945) (noting that “due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it 
‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice”’”) (citations omitted); id. at 319 (noting “the criteria” for adjudicating personal jurisdictional 
“cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative”).  Article 6(1) has been a cause for concern for non-
Europeans, since it has been used to assert jurisdiction over defendants from outside the European Union 
even in cases where the dispute would more logically be heard elsewhere.  See Brussels I Regulation, 
supra note 16, art. 6(1); Owusu v. Jackson, Case C-281/02, [2005] Eur. Ct. Rep. I-1381 (ECJ), [2005] 
Q.B. 801 (Eng.); S.I. Strong, Backyard Advantage:  New Rules Mean That U.S. Companies May be 
Forced to Litigate Across the Pond, 28 LEGAL TIMES 43 (May 23, 2005).  Notably, jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries is set to expand under the proposed revisions to the Brussels I Regulation.  See Brussels I 
Recast, supra note 4, ¶¶1.2, 3.1, 17 (as amended), art. 34 (as amended).    
105
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 9(1), 16(1), 19(2); see also id. ¶13. 
106
 See id. art. 24. 
107
 See id.  
108
 See id.  But see id. art. 22 (indicating some instances where certain courts have exclusive jurisdiction).  
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place where suit is brought other than on the basis of lack of jurisdiction,
109
 the Brussels I 
Regulation includes a number of mechanisms intended to protect defendants from procedural 
improprieties, most notably the possibility of parallel suits.
110
  The most useful provision in this 
regard is article 27, which prohibits the bringing of “the same cause of action . . . between the 
same parties” in the courts of a second Member State.111   
Although the jurisdictional principles contained in the Brussels I Regulation appear 
relatively clear on their face, problems can arise in the collective context when one or more 
parties attempt to exercise their individual participatory rights to file an action separately from 
the collective proceeding.
112
  These issues can best be described through use of a hypothetical.    
Assume a collective dispute is filed in the court of Member State A, a court with 
jurisdiction over the matter.  The action is the first to be filed with respect to the collective 
                                                          
109
 The common law principle of forum non conveniens does not apply within the European Union.  See 
Owusu v. Jackson, [2005] Eur. Ct. Rep. I-1381, ¶46.  However, courts with “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
an action will be given priority in certain limited circumstances.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 
16, arts. 22, 25, 29.  Otherwise, the court first seised of a matter will have priority to hear a matter, so 
long as jurisdiction is proper.  See id. art. 30.  Some commentators writing in the context of competition 
law have suggested that the first-seised rule could result in problems if the first court is somehow less 
than competent to handle these sorts of complex claims.  See Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 383-84; 
Danov, Competition Law, supra note 73, at 52-53.  This issue could also arise in the context of collective 
suits, in that a small regional court may not be equipped to hear a complex inter-European collective 
claim.  However, at this point defendants faced with this prospect have no recourse under European law. 
110
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, ¶15.  However, some commentators take the view that the 
Brussels I Regulation provides insufficient protection against vexatious, duplicative litigation.  See 
Barnett, supra note 18, at 954-57. 
111
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 27.  Under article 27(1), the second suit will be stayed 
until jurisdiction is properly established in the court first seised of the matter.  See id.  If and when 
jurisdiction is determined to be proper in the court first seised of the matter, the second court must decline 
jurisdiction under article 27(2).  See id.  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to consider issues 
relating to parallel proceedings in a European Member State and a third country, the proposed revisions to 
the Brussels I Regulation address this issue, which could be relevant in cases involving a U.S. class action 
and an inter-European collective dispute.  See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, ¶3.1.2; see also Fentiman, 
supra note 93, at 65.  
112
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16. 
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injury, resulting in the court in Member State A being the first seised of the matter.
113
  
Furthermore, the domestic law of Member State A allows for cross-border collectives to be 
formed on an opt-in basis, consistent with the principles espoused by the European Parliament in 
the Resolution.
114
  For the sake of argument, imagine that Member State A also allows national 
collective actions to be formed on an opt-out basis, consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity.
115
  Now assume that at least one person – Person A – domiciled in Member State A 
has properly opted out of the group action
116
 and at least one person – Person B – domiciled in 
Member State B has declined to opt into the group action.  Can Person A and/or Person B (i.e., 
the non-participating parties) bring suit in another court in the European Union that has 
jurisdiction over the matter under the Brussels I Regulation?
117
  What factors should guide that 
decision and what constitutional concerns might arise as a result of this procedural choice? 
First, it would not appear as if the second suit is barred under article 27 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, since Persons A and B are not parties to the collective proceeding in Member State 
A.
118
  However, the question of whether non-participants to a collective action can or should be 
                                                          
113
 See id. art. 30.  Slightly different problems could arise if an individual action is filed before the 
collective suit, although those issues can be considered within the framework of the current analysis.  See 
infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
114
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶20. 
115
 See id. ¶M, 4, 20. 
116
 The same type of concern would arise if Member State A used an opt-in mechanism for domestic 
parties as well as foreign parties, and the person in Member State A chose not to opt into the collective 
proceeding.     
117
 This Article sets aside the issue of whether Person A or B could subsequently assert an individual or 
collective claim outside the European Union against the same defendant as in the suit filed in Member 
State A or against another defendant, such as a corporate parent.  However, given the attractive nature of 
the U.S. punitive damages scheme, this situation is likely to arise with some frequency.  
118
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 27; see also Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 381; 
Danov, Competition Law, supra note 73, at 39 (discussing standard for article 27 under Gubisch 
Maschinen-fabrik v Palumbo, Case 144/86 [1987] ECR 4861, ¶14).  Although at least one court has 
appeared to disregard the precise language of article 27 in the context of test cases, that seems a poor 
result, given the patent applicability of article 28.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 27-28; 
see also Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., [1990] 2 Q.B. 338, 348-49 (C.A.) (Eng.); Wasserman, supra note 
18, at 340-41; see also supra note 134.   
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considered the same as parties to the collective suit is highly contentious and not yet thoroughly 
analyzed in Europe or elsewhere.
119
  However, one commentator writing in the context of 
disputes seated in the United States and involving plaintiffs from outside the United States has 
noted that:  
[a]lthough foreign laws authorizing group litigation are in an enormous state of 
flux right now, the current differences among group litigation vehicles suggest 
that foreign courts may hesitate before concluding that a class action and a 
follow-up action by an individual absent class member against the same defendant 
involve the “same parties” for purposes of claim preclusion.120 
 
As difficult as this question may be in some jurisdictions, the European analysis may be 
simplified as a result of the European Parliament’s recent remark that “individual victims should 
remain free not to pursue the opt-in collective action but instead to seek redress individually.”121   
Furthermore, reference to the full text of the governing document
122
 – the Brussels I 
Regulation – strongly suggests that article 27 should be set aside in favor of article 28, which 
refers to situations “[w]here related actions are pending in the courts of different Member 
States.”123  Two actions are considered to be “related” in cases “where they are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
                                                          
119
 See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 345-46. 
120
 Id. at 380. 
121
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27.   
122
 U.S.-trained lawyers should take some care when anticipating how European legislation is or should be 
interpreted, since different countries apply different techniques to statutory interpretation.  See Nathalie 
Hofmann, Interpretation Rules and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK’s Ratification of the CISG and to 
the Harmonization of Contract Law In Europe, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 145, 154 (2010); Giulio Itzcovich, 
The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice, 10 GERMAN L.J. 537, 549-57 
(2009) (noting different means of interpreting European Union legislation).   
123
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(1).  However, even if the litigants are considered “the 
same parties” such that article 27 applies, the analysis is largely the same as that conducted herein under 
article 28, since the two solutions under article 27 – stay or dismissal – are also contemplated under 
article 28.  See id. arts. 27-28. 
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irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.”124  Because there is no 
requirement under article 28 that the parties in question be the same, this seems to be the 
provision that should apply to disputes involving plaintiffs such as Person A and Person B.
125
 
Article 28 gives a court faced with a related action several procedural options.
126
  First, 
under article 28(1), the second court may “stay its proceedings,” presumably pending the 
outcome of the first action.
127
  Second, under article 28(2), the second court may decline 
jurisdiction “if the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law 
permits the consolidation thereof.”128  Notably, the second court cannot technically order 
consolidation of the first and second action in the court of Member State A, since the second 
court has no power over judicial proceedings in another sovereign state.
129
  However, an order of 
dismissal directed at the parties can be quite persuasive, since it effectively strips non-
participating parties of an alternate forum in which the dispute can be heard and forces them to 
join the first suit if they wish to have their rights adjudicated.
130
  Third, the second court could 
                                                          
124
 Id. art. 28(3); see also Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 382-83 (discussing irreconcilability in 
collective context); Tang, supra note 94, at 90-92 (discussing two strands of thought regarding 
irreconcilability). 
125
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(3); Danov, Competition Law, supra note 73, at 41. 
126
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28. 
127
 Id. art. 28(1). 
128
 Id. art. 28(2).  Consolidation in Member State A would in most cases appear permissible, since the 
very nature of the collective proceedings contemplates multiple parties. 
129
 This principle is illustrated in jurisprudence concerning anti-suit injunctions, where courts in one state 
only have power over the parties, not over the foreign court.  See Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 78 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating an injunction because it “purport[ed] to place the 
court in the position of supervising the law enforcement activities of a foreign sovereign nation against its 
own citizens on its own soil”); Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 2d 743, 
745 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that “numerous courts have recognized a district court's power to issue an 
anti-suit injunction that enjoins litigants over which it has in personam jurisdiction from pursuing 
duplicative litigation in a foreign forum”); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global 
Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 81-82 (2009). 
130
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
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allow the related action to proceed in parallel with the collective action in Member State A, 
although this alternative may be somewhat disfavored.
131
 
As a policy matter, dismissal under article 28(2) seems the better course of action, since 
that approach preserves judicial resources and promotes consistency in judgments, something 
that is critically important in cross-border collective disputes.
132
  However, by denying parties of 
their preferred forum, article 28(2) appears to violate the non-participating parties’ fundamental 
and constitutional right to choose the time and place that they assert their legal claims.
133
   
This is, of course, only a problem to the extent that individual participatory rights are 
defined as being absolute or very nearly so.
134
  Initially, dismissal raises significant concerns, 
given statements from the European Parliament that “individual victims should remain free not 
                                                          
131
 This third option is recognized only implicitly in language indicating that the second court’s powers to 
stay or dismiss the second action are only discretionary.  See id. art. 28.  In many ways, it appears as if the 
drafters of the Brussels I Regulation did not contemplate this alternative being used much, if at all, based 
on the purpose and intent of the Brussels I Regulation to diminish the incidence of concurrent proceedings 
and the grammatical construction of article 28 itself.  See id. ¶15, art. 28.  For example, not only does 
article 28 fail to mention the possibility of parallel proceedings, it also implicitly suggests the existence of 
only two procedural alternatives by indicating that the second court “may stay” its proceedings and “may 
also . . . decline jurisdiction.”  Id. art. 28.  Commentators also suggest that proceedings are not to run in 
parallel, although certain unusual circumstances could create exceptions to the general rule.  See C.J.S. 
Knight, Complicating Simplicity:  The “Court First Seised” and “Related Actions” in Article 28, 27 
CIVIL JUST. Q. 454, 459-60 (2008).  
132
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2); see also Resolution, supra note 5, ¶5; Strong, Quo 
Vadis, supra note 18.  
133
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16 art. 28(2). 
134
 See Le Sueur, supra note 29, at 469-74 (discussing extent to which certain rights have override powers 
or are subject to a margin of appreciation).  Absolute or heightened protection of the individual right to 
sue might make more sense if individuals were, in fact, commonly exercising their abilities to do so.  
However, this is typically not the case in situations where collective redress would be appropriate.  
Furthermore, European jurisprudence has been able to recognize various “fake” conflicts regarding 
important procedural rights and to undertake any necessary balancing analyses.  See Stijn Smet, Freedom 
of Expression and the Right to Reputation:  Human Rights in Conflict, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 183, 188-
89 (2010).  Interestingly, the English Court of Appeal denied the claim that individual participatory rights 
are absolute in a large-scale proceeding involving test cases.  See Ashmore v. British Coal Corp., [1990] 2 
Q.B. 338, 348-49 (C.A.) (Eng.); Wasserman, supra note 18, at 340-41 (discussing claimant’s view that 
she had an “absolute right” to sue in the absence of claim or issue preclusion or an agreement to be bound 
by the test cases).  However, aggregative litigation schemes that rely on test cases are uniquely situated, in 
that the explicit intent is that the test cases should act as a precedent for later disputes.  Therefore, 
Ashmore may not be relevant in all contexts.  See Ashmore, [1990] 2 Q.B. at 348-49. 
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to pursue the opt-in collective action but instead to seek redress individually.”135   While these 
rights were explicitly made subject to “the general rules of private international law laid down in 
the Brussels I, Rome I and Rome II regulations,” it would be very strange to recognize a right 
only to allow its immediate curtailment.
136
 
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that article 28(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation specifically allows courts to deny plaintiffs in bilateral disputes the right to choose 
the place where their claims will be heard by allowing courts to “decline jurisdiction if the court 
first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation 
thereof.”137  If the European Parliament’s remark about individual participatory rights is taken at 
face value, it might lead to parties to collective disputes being treated more deferentially under 
the Brussels I Regulation than parties to bilateral disputes.
138
   
The answer to this dilemma may lie in the fact that article 28(2) does not affect the 
plaintiff’s decision as to whether and when to assert a claim.139  Instead, it only affects the place 
where the claim may be brought.  This suggests that it may be possible or indeed desirable to 
separate out the different elements of the individual participatory right in collective disputes, 
distinguishing in this instance between the right to decide whether and when to assert a claim on 
the one hand and the right to decide where to assert a claim on the other.
140
  In so doing, it may 
be possible to determine whether one of these constituent rights is more important than the others 
                                                          
135
 Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27. 
136
 Id.  
137
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
138
 See id.; Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27.  This does not seem to be the European Parliament’s intent, 
given statements indicating that collective claimants are not to be given a preferential position in other 
regards, such as access to evidence.  See id. ¶20. 
139
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
140
 This type of unbundling approach reflects the analytical method suggested by Cass Sunstein.  See 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 99. 
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and whether one of these sub-elements actually forms the indivisible core of what has heretofore 
been considered a single, unitary right.
141
   
Given the language of article 28(2), it would appear that the right to decide where a claim 
may be brought can be made subject to a balancing analysis that takes into account a number of 
different factors.
142
  Some of these elements are policy-based (for example, efficiency and the 
preservation of judicial resources) while others are more rights-based (for example, the right to 
avoid irreconcilable judgments, which would be a right accruing to the defendant as the common 
party in this situation).
143
   
This type of deconstructionist analysis, which has not been considered before in the 
context of collective redress, is highly intriguing, since it makes the various factors to be 
considered more transparent.
144
  Furthermore, it is consistent with the idea that: 
[t]hough the rhetoric of “fundamental rights” is used to describe rights relating to 
access to justice, in practice the courts . . . have recognised that the rights are 
limited by utilitarian factors.  Unlike many other fundamental rights (think of 
freedom of expression), rights about access to justice require public expenditure:  
they assume a functioning legal system with courts and (to an extent) provision of 
public funds to assist people finance [sic] litigation.  In the light of this stark fact, 




Although declining jurisdiction under article 28(2) may make sense legally, it could 
cause problems politically, since it makes the suit in Member State A look very much like a 
mandatory collective action, something that is suspect as a matter of European policy.
146
  This is 
intriguing, since individual plaintiffs are being told in both a mandatory collective action and an 
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 See id. 
142
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
143
 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 944; Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
144
 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 99.  
145
 Le Sueur, supra note 29, at 473.  The question, of course, is whether this sort of balancing analysis 
complies with the requirements of the Charter.  See Charter, supra note 30, art. 52(1). 
146
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2).  While it is possible that the non-participating 
parties could find a third Member State with jurisdiction over their claims, there is no guarantee that this 
third court would not decline jurisdiction as well. 
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article 28(2) dismissal that they cannot pursue their claims in the place and manner of their 
choosing, based on concerns relating to expediency and the risk of irreconcilable judgments.
147
  
However, this additional element – “the manner of their choosing” – could be significant in this 
analysis and could distinguish dismissal of a bilateral suit under article 28(2) from dismissal of a 
suit related to a collective action, since some people may see something inherently different 
between proceeding as a member of a collective and proceeding as an individual.
148
  As such, 
this new element could constitute sufficient means to defeat dismissal of a related action under 
article 28(2) of the Brussels I Regulation.
149
  If so, then this additional factor – namely, the 
means by which a claim is asserted – could be considered to be as much of a fundamental 
constitutional right as the ability to chose whether and when to assert a claim, and thus perhaps 
should be added to the trio of existing elements that are normally viewed as making up the 
individual participatory right.
150
   
At this point, it is unclear from the text of the Resolution whether the European 
Parliament wishes to protect only the right to proceed individually or whether the aim is simply 
to protect the right to proceed separately from the collective, which would include the right to 
bring a second collective action as well as an individual action.
151
  While the answer to this 
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 See id. art. 28(3).   
148
 To some extent, issues regarding plaintiffs’ right to choose the manner of proceeding have been 
obscured in the legal literature due to the overarching perception, at least in the United States and Canada, 
that it is counsel that drives decisions about litigation tactics.  See Jasminka Kalajdzic, Self-Interest, 
Public Interest, and the Interests of the Absent Client:  Legal Ethics and the Class Action Praxis, 49 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 8, 10, 15-19 (2011); Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1939, 1948 (2011).  However, the focus of this analysis may be changing.  See supra 
note 97. 
149
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
150
 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
151
 For example, the Resolution notes that “individual victims should remain free not to pursue the opt-in 
collective action,” which suggests the right at issue involves the ability to proceed individually, but also 
notes the need to avoid “subsequent unnecessary individual or collective actions concerning the same 
infringement,” which suggests that subsequent collective actions – if necessary – would be permitted.  
Resolution, supra note 5, ¶¶20, 27.  The propriety of a second collective action could depend on whether 
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question could be determinative of a number of issues, it is possible, even in the absence of an 
answer to this question, to consider the kinds of factors a court can or should take into account 
when deciding whether to dismiss an action under article 28(2) of the Brussels I Regulation in 
favor of a collective proceeding in another Member State.
152
   
One important issue involves the matter of whether the second suit is individual or 
collective in nature.  An individual suit would likely be considered more deferentially than a 
second collective suit, since the plaintiff asserting an individual claim would appear to be truly 
interested in asserting his or her individual participatory rights, however those rights are 
defined.
153
  Furthermore, a second collective suit would likely be tainted by the perception that 
the plaintiffs were engaging in forum shopping or were bringing the case for strike suit 
purposes.
154
  Neither of these tactics are welcome in a framework that attempts to “avoid[] 
excessive litigation and subsequent unnecessary individual or collective actions concerning the 
same infringement.”155   
Nevertheless, there might be some circumstances where it would be appropriate to bring 
a second collective suit.  For example, such an action might be justified if there are significant 
differences in the substantive or procedural law applicable to the two proceedings, since it might 
seem inequitable to force a party who has explicitly chosen not to opt into one lawsuit to become 
involved that proceeding even though it does not offer the same rights or remedies that are 
available in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.156  Thus far, much of the focus has been on potential 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
it is brought simultaneously with the first or subsequently.  See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class 
Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 464-65 (2000). 
152
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
153
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶26; see also Wasserman, supra note 18, at 380.  
154
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶¶2, 26.   
155
 Id. ¶20. 
156
 For example, a court might find it relevant if Member State A only offered injunctive relief while 
Member State B offered compensatory relief.  With sixteen different national systems of collective 
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differences in substantive law, with the Resolution recognizing the need to examine existing 
conflict-of-law rules to avoid problems associated with cross-border litigation.
157
  However, no 
mention is made about conflict-of-laws issues relating to variations in procedural law,
158
 even 
though procedural matters can have as much of an impact on the assertion of collective claims as 
substantive matters and the European Charter emphasizes the importance of an “effective 
remedy” at law.159 
Another factor that may be relevant to the dismissal analysis under article 28(2) of the 
Brussels I Regulation involves the nationalities of the parties bringing the second suit.
160
  Some 
courts may take the view that certain vulnerable parties (namely consumers, employees and 
insureds) have the right to pursue their claims in their domicile, regardless of whether a 
collective claim is pending in another Member State.
161
  However, courts considering the 
strength of this argument will need to take into account the way in which a collective suit 
equalizes the power imbalance between plaintiffs and defendants, transforming parties that may 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
redress currently established within the European Union, there is scope for significant variation in 
procedures.  See Directorate General for Internal Policies, supra note 4, at 5; see also id. at 38 (noting 
European Member States have adopted four general types of collective redress:  “group and representative 
actions, test case procedures and procedures for skimming off profits”). 
157
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27.  Notably, some Member States take the view that a coherent 
European scheme of cross-border collective redress is only appropriate in cases where European law is 
already harmonized, since the conflict of laws issues would otherwise become too difficult to implement.  
See UK Response to EU Consultation on Collective Redress, ¶7, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/uk_en.pdf. 
158
 The Resolution implicitly recognizes the problems associated with variations in national procedure.  
See id. ¶¶H, 4.  Of course, the idea that a conflict-of-laws analysis may be necessary vis-à-vis cross-
border collective procedures is relatively new.  See S.I. Strong, Mass Torts and Arbitration:  Lessons 
From Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, in UNCERTAINTY AND MASS TORT:  CAUSATION AND PROOF __ 
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Mass Torts]; Strong, Canada, supra note 20.   
159
 Charter, supra note 30, art. 47; see also Strong, Mass Torts, supra note 158; Strong, Canada, supra 
note 20. 
160
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
161
 See id. arts. 9(1), 16(1), 19(2); see also id. ¶13. 
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have been considered individually vulnerable into a powerful collective entity.
162
  It might also 
be relevant for courts to consider the extent to which arguments based on nationality give rise to 
concerns about non-discrimination and equal access to justice.
163
   
Finally, some courts may find it relevant to consider whether relief as to one plaintiff 
provides relief as to all.
164
  Certainly those issues have been considered sufficient to justify 
creation of a mandatory collective in other jurisdictions and might support dismissal of an action 
under article 28(2) of the Brussels I Regulation.
165
    
 As this discussion suggests, dismissal of an action under article 28(2) is problematic as a 
matter of constitutional and European law.
166
  However, courts faced with an action that is 
related to an ongoing collective suit do not have to dismiss the second action under article 28 of 
the Brussels I Regulation.
167
  Instead, they may decide to stay the second action pending the 
outcome of the first suit or possibly decide to proceed with the second suit in parallel to the 
first.
168
  However, both of these options raise significant problems as a matter of constitutional 
and fundamental human rights law.  These issues are considered in the following subsection in 
the context of enforcement. 
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 See Strong, Canada, supra note 20; S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of 
Arbitration?  Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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 For example, a claim based on nationality might allow Person B, who was not domiciled in the place 
where the first collective action was brought, to bring an individual claim while Person A could not.   
164
 This type of situation arises most frequently in cases involving injunctions.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(1); see also id. 23(b)(2). 
165
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2); Le Sueur, supra note 29, at 469 (noting need for 
non-discrimination in national courts).  Interestingly, some U.S. commentators hold that mandatory 
classes, including those created for injunctive relief, are unconstitutional.  See REDISH, supra note 97; 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional? 109 MICH. L. REV. 993, 998 (2011) (book 
review). 
166
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(2). 
167
 See id. 
168
 See id. art. 28; see also supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. 
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B. Enforcement concerns relating to cross-border collective redress 
Cross-border collective redress creates more than just jurisdictional concerns.  Enforcement is 
also potentially problematic, even though the Brussels I Regulation is explicitly intended to 
create an easy and predictable means of recognizing and enforcing judgments rendered by courts 
in another Member State.
169
  Although commentators from the United States often analogize the 
Brussels I Regulation to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, European 
experts see the procedures in a slightly different light.
170
   
According to the Brussels I Regulation, judgments from one Member State may only be 
denied recognition or enforcement
171
 in another Member State in one of a very few 
circumstances described in articles 34 or 35.
172
  The best-known basis for non-recognition or 
enforcement involves judgments whose recognition would be “manifestly contrary to public 
policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.”173  This provision has been used to 
oppose the adoption of opt-out procedures in any European-wide system of collective redress, 
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 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, ¶17, arts. 33, 38, 53.  In the absence of an international 
agreement such as the Brussels I Regulation, parties seeking recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment have to rely on international comity, which is notoriously unpredictable.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 
159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895); GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
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170
 See U.S. CONST., art. IV, §1; Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; Barnett, supra note 18, at 956; 
Andrea M. Corcoran & Terry L. Hart, The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the EU 
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 The distinction between “recognition” and “enforcement” of a judgment can occasionally cause 
confusion.  “Recognition” of a foreign judgment gives the judgment the status of a national court 
judgment in that state.  See Barnett, supra note 18, at 954.  However, most parties want more than just 
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judgment.  In those cases, parties seek to have the judgment “enforced.”  In some jurisdictions, it is 
necessary to complete the procedures necessary for recognition (exequatur) before proceeding to 
enforcement.  See id. at 944-45.  In other jurisdictions, it is possible to combine the two procedures.  The 
proposed revisions to the Brussels I Regulation would do away with exequatur proceedings in cases other 
than collective proceedings.  See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, ¶3.1.1. 
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 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 34-35. 
173
 Id. art. 34(1); see also Danov, Competition Law, supra note 73, at 48-49 (discussing litigation rights in 
competition context and interplay with public policy exception under Brussels I Regulation). 
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based on the argument that some Member States view collectives based on opt-out jurisdiction as 
contrary to fundamental principles of constitutional law and hence to public policy.
174
   
Interestingly, arguments stemming from the public policy exception seems to be based 
largely, if not exclusively, on practical concerns about whether parties who fail to opt out of a 
collective action have done so as a matter of conscious choice or as a result of errors in the 
notification process.
175
  If that is indeed the true nature of the objection, then this type of public 
policy concern would appear to be entirely subsumed by article 34(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, which allows non-recognition in cases involving insufficient notice.
176
  Since issues 
arising under article 34(2) can be resolved through adequate notice provisions, it would appear 
that many, if not all, constitutional and public policy objections to opt-out relief could also be 
met through processes ensuring proper notice.
177
   
While this argument makes sense as a matter of logic, political opposition to opt-out 
relief is such that the European Parliament’s decision to allow only opt-in actions in cross-border 
matters is unlikely to change.
178
  However, the analysis does suggest that there are no blanket 
objections that can be made to opt-in actions under article 34(1) and (2), since the affirmative 
behavior required under opt-in procedures addresses both the constitutional concerns about 
individual participatory rights as well as public policy concerns about notice.
179
  
                                                          
174
 See Monestier, supra note 3, at 38-39. 
175
 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
176
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34. 
177
 See Jocelyn G. Delatre, Beyond the White Paper:  Rethinking the Commission’s Proposal on Private 
Antitrust Litigation, 8 COMP. L. REV. 29, 52 (2011); see also Tavoulareas v. Tsavliris (The Atlas Pride) 
[2006] EWHC 414, ¶39 (Comm.) (Eng.). 
178
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶20. 
179
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34. 
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Article 34 describes two other ways in which a collective judgment can fail to obtain 
recognition.
180
  Both of these involve the possibility that the judgment whose recognition or 
enforcement is being sought is “irreconcilable” with a judgment of the enforcing court or the 
court of another Member State.
181
  However, these two provisions explicitly state that the two 
judgments in question must be between “the same parties,” therefore running into the same 
problem that arose with respect to article 27, namely whether non-participants to a collective suit 
in one Member State who want to assert their rights separately (i.e., people like Person A and 
Person B) can be considered “the same parties” as parties to the collective proceeding.182  
The analysis here is the same as it was previously, with the European Parliament’s 
statement in the Resolution concerning the protection of individual participatory rights 
suggesting that courts will be unable to conclude that the parties are the same, at least when the 
second suit involves an individual claim.
183
  However, this leads to an interesting dilemma.  If 
the non-participating parties are not identical with those in the collective suit, then neither article 
34(3) nor article 34(4) can apply, thus requiring recognition and enforcement of the collective 
judgment even if it is inconsistent or even irreconcilable with a judgment in the second suit.
184
   
                                                          
180
 See id.  Grounds for non-recognition under article 35 are not relevant to this discussion.  See id. art. 35. 
181
 This includes irreconcilability with a judgment of the Member State where recognition and 
enforcement are currently being sought as well as a third Member State.  See id.arts. 34(3), 34(4).   
182
 See id. art. 34; see also supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.  This aspect of article 34 does not 
seem to be well-discussed judicially, with only a passing reference in the English case law.  See 
Tavoulareas v. Tsavliris (The Atlas Pride) [2006] EWHC 414, ¶48 (Comm.) (Eng.); see also Hess, supra 
note 17, at 116 (noting this question is open). 
183
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶27. 
184
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34; Danov, Brussels I, supra note 17, at 393.  One 
possible way to avoid this outcome would be to claim that irreconcilable judgments are contrary to public 
policy, even if they are not between the same parties, thus bringing the judgment under article 34(1).  See 
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34(1).  However, that approach seems somewhat disingenuous, 
given that the concept of individual participatory rights would appear to contemplate the possibility of 
inconsistent judgments but to set those concerns aside in order to prioritize the ability of an individual 
plaintiff to sue at the time, place and possibly manner of his or her choosing.  Furthermore, the public 
policy exception is said to be used only in exceptional circumstances.  See Danov, Brussels I, supra note 
17, at 390. 
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This conclusion obviously has potentially significant repercussions for the defendant, 
since the lack of any grounds upon which to base an action for non-recognition means that most, 
if not all, collective suits will be enforced in other Member States.
185
  Furthermore, this 
conclusion also has ramifications regarding the decision whether to stay a second action under 
article 28 of the Brussels I Regulation.
186
 
The motivating factor underlying an article 28 stay appears to be legal consistency, in 
that staying the second suit pending the outcome of the first suit will allow the second suit to be 
decided in accordance with the principles outlined in the first suit.
187
  This purpose is reflected in 
language permitting the court to consider a stay only in circumstances where there is a “risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.”188  However, for that rationale to 
carry weight, there would need to be some sort of preclusive value attached to the first 
judgment,
189
 even though there was no precise identity of parties.
190
   
                                                          
185
 Of course, there could be individual grounds for non-recognition under article 34 (for example, lack of 
proper notice in that particular case), but there are no blanket objections that would apply.  See Brussels I 
Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34.   
186
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28; see also supra note 166-68.  Although such issues are 
beyond the scope of this Article, questions arise as to the impact of article 34(4) on individual 
participatory rights of parties who have chosen not to proceed in the foreign collective action.  See 
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 34(4); see also Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, art. 34 (as 
amended).  This could involve issues relating to a parallel class action seated in the United States.   
187
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note16, art. 28.    
188
 Id. art. 28(3). 
189
 There are three basic types of preclusion.  See Barnett, supra note 18, at 944.  Any one of these three 
could be at issue in a case involving collective suits and individual participatory rights.  However, the 
most likely type of preclusion that would be sought in a case involving a non-participating party would be 
issue preclusion.  See id. at 949-51. 
190
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28 (noting the actions are only “related”); see also Briggs 
& Rees, supra note 92, ¶726 (citing C-351/96 Drourut Assurances SA v. CMI [1998] ECR I-3075); 
Barnett, supra note 18, at 944 (noting the need for “the same parties (or their privies)”); K.R. Handley,  
Res Judicata in the European Court,  L. Q. REV. 191 (2000).  Enforcement of the first judgment, in whole 
or in part, would appear to be proper under article 48.  See id. art. 48.  However, this provision has not 
been discussed by the European Court of Justice, with only one case appearing to cite the provision’s 
statutory predecessor.  See Van den Boogaard v. Laumen, Case C-220/95, ECR 1997 Page I-01147 
(discussing article 42 in the Brussels Convention). 
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While that line of analysis makes sense as a matter of logic, it is problematic as a matter 
of law because the concept of preclusion is not addressed in the Brussels I Regulation.
191
  
Instead, the document speaks only of recognition and enforcement, raising significant questions 
as to what effect a collective judgment that is recognized in another Member State would have 
on a subsequent related litigation.
192
   
Given the Brussels I Regulation’s silence on this matter, commentators have advised 
courts to turn to domestic law for guidance.
193
  However, problems again arise, in this case due 
to the significant amount of national variation with respect to the concept of preclusion.
194
  For 
example:  
[i]n . . . England and Wales, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States . . . 
judgments have issue preclusive effect.  In . . . other countries, however – 
Germany, France, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland – judgments have no issue 
preclusive effect.  When coupled with the narrow definition of the claim for 
purposes of claim preclusion employed in these countries and the failure to accord 
settlements claim preclusive effect, this lack of issue preclusive effect may leave 
parties with a fair bit of room to relitigate matters already adjudicated by 




Although the analysis is highly unpredictable,
196
 the outcome will nevertheless ultimately 
depend on:  
the willingness (or not) of . . . European countries to bind persons who were not 
formally named as parties to the prior litigation. . . . European countries uniformly 
limit the claim preclusive effect of a judgment to the parties to the proceedings, 
but not all of them define the “parties to the proceedings” identically.  All of the 
participating European countries [in a study conducted by the British Institute of 
                                                          
191
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16; see Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18 (discussing a number 
of problems relating to preclusion). 
192
 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 945.  The European understanding of the preclusive effects of a 
judgment is not the same as it is in the United States.  See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 335-39.   
193
 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 956. 
194
 See id. at 953-57; Wasserman, supra note 18, at 344-45.  
195
 Wasserman, supra note 18, at 344-45 (citations omitted) (considering a study conducted by the British 
Institute for International and Comparative Law (BIICL)); see also Barnett, supra note 18, at 953-57.   
196
 Commentators agree that problems regarding preclusion will only increase in the future.  See Barnett, 
supra note 18, at 945, 957; Wasserman, supra note 18, at 379.   
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International and Comparative Law, or BIICL] bind persons named as parties to 
the first action and their legal successors.  Some countries also bind absentees if 
their interests were represented in the action.  The BIICL Report notes that “[t]his 
may occur in the context of group and representative actions.” 197 
 
Courts considering these issues must conduct a rights analysis, weighing the pros and 
cons of each of the various possible outcomes.
198
  For example, if a stay is imposed under article 
28, but the collective judgment is given no preclusive value, then the parties to the second suit 
have only suffered a delay.
199
  While too long a wait could give rise to constitutional concerns, 
this is perhaps the best option from an individual plaintiff’s perspective, since it allows the 
plaintiff to choose the time (albeit somewhat delayed), place and manner of making a claim.
200
   
However, courts must also take into account the defendant’s constitutional or fundamental rights 
regarding the absence of any preclusive value being attached to the earlier judgment as well as 
public policies regarding efficiency and preservation of judicial resources.
201
  A number of 
additional factors would likely be relevant to this analysis, including (1) the implications 
associated with potentially inconsistent or irreconcilable judgments (i.e., would the judgments be 
truly irreconcilable, as in the case of competing judgments, or would the inconsistency relate to 
an issue of less significance, constitutionally speaking),
202
 (2) the extent to which the plaintiffs in 
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 Wasserman, supra note 18, at 345 (citations omitted) (writing in the context of cross-border class 
actions involving U.S. class actions); see also id. at 379.  
198
 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 99, 101.  For an analysis involving the defendant’s individual 
participatory rights, see Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
199
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28. 
200
 In some cases, a delay of trial could be so long as to constitute a breach of the right of access to justice.  
See Fawcett, supra note 28, at 9; Le Sueur, supra note 29, at 466-67.  However, concerns about delay 
may be assuaged to the extent that the non-participant whose proceeding has been delayed could join the 
collective suit in the other jurisdiction.   
201
 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of defense rights in collective litigation, 
see Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
202
 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 946 (discussing situations involving “abusive re-litigation in which 
contradiction of the earlier foreign judgment is what describes the claimant’s cross-border action”); 
Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
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the second suit intend to raise entirely new arguments
203
 and (3) the status of the second suit as 
individual or collective in nature.
204
  
Alternatively, the court could decide to stay the second suit and give the first judgment 
some preclusive value concerning issues and/or claims to be raised in the second suit.
205
  
Notably, this approach is highly problematic for the plaintiff in the second suit, since he or she 
could find certain claims limited or eliminated entirely by virtue of the judgment in the first 
action.  If this is the likely outcome, then many parties would be better served by opting into the 
collective action, since they would then have some chance of influencing that action’s litigation 
strategy and perhaps improving their chances of recovery.
206
  Notably, if a plaintiff declines the 
opportunity to join the collective and instead pursues a separate action, then that party’s 
individual participatory rights are formally respected, but with a possible diminution in their 
effective value.  However, that might be considered a suitable response in light of the other rights 
and interests at stake.
207
  
Notably, the precise effect on the plaintiff’s individual participatory rights will not be 
known until after the first suit is concluded.  Although individual plaintiffs could suffer the 
effective loss of their claims if the defendant wins the first suit and the judgment is given 
preclusive value, those same plaintiffs will not suffer any injury to their claims if the plaintiffs in 
                                                          
203
 See Wasserman, supra note 18, at 344-45 (suggesting parties may be better able to avoid the preclusive 
effect of earlier judgments to the extent a subsequent action advances new theories); Strong, Quo Vadis, 
supra note 18. 
204
 The nationalities of the parties and the differences between the procedural or substantive law to be 
used in the first and second proceeding might also have some bearing on the court’s analysis, although 
these issues seem less persuasive in the context of a preclusion analysis than in a jurisdictional analysis.  
See supra notes 154-63 and accompanying text. 
205
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28; see Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
206
 Empirical evidence from the United States indicates that individual plaintiffs seldom wish to become 
individually involved in the conduct of a class action, suggesting that plaintiffs in pan-European 
collective suits might be similarly disinclined to participate actively in a large-scale legal action.  See 
WILLGING ET AL., supra note 21, at 55-59. 
207
 See supra notes 145, 201 and accompanying text; see also Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18 
(undertaking a detailed balancing analysis). 
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the collective action win, since the earlier judgment will have no negative impact on an 
individual plaintiff’s case.208   
However, questions arise as to whether it is fair to the defendant to allow a potentially 
large group of plaintiffs to take this kind of wait-and-see attitude, since one of the major aims of 
collective redress is to provide parties with a single and final determination regarding the 
collective injury.
209
  Plaintiffs in the first action might also object to subsequent individual 
plaintiffs acting as “free riders” off of the first action, since later plaintiffs can use the first case 
as a type of roadmap to a winning argument, even if the first judgment is not given preclusive 
value in another Member State.  The free rider problem might be particularly acute given the 
widespread use in Europe of loser-pays rules
210
 and the European Parliament’s disinclination to 
change these rules in cases involving collective redress.
211
  Indeed, many courts might find it 
inequitable to allow individual plaintiffs to opt out of the first action because of a concern about 
costs, only to reap the benefit later of a nearly sure judgment (or settlement) in their favor. 
As the preceding suggests, utilizing a stay under article 28(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 
is not a panacea to the difficulties associated with individual participatory rights.
212
  Some courts, 
recognizing the potentially fatal effects of a negative judgment arising out of a collective suit in 
another Member State on an individual plaintiff’s case as well as the inequities associated with 
allowing an individual plaintiff to act as a free rider on an earlier collective suit that is successful, 
could decide to neither stay nor dismiss the second action under article 28, but instead allow the 
                                                          
208
 It is assumed here that a defendant who lost the collective suit would be able to block later plaintiffs 
from using a that judgment to their benefit, but there are a number of permutations to consider.  See infra 
notes 235-52 and accompanying text; see also Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18.   
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 See Hensler, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
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 See id. at 22; Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18.   
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issues relating to allocation of costs to individual Member States). 
212
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, art. 28(1). 
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second action to go forward, effectively allowing a race to judgment.
213
  Since bilateral actions 
typically take less time than multilateral actions, this approach might have the effect of reversing 
the preclusion analysis, with the second-filed action being the first to have judgment entered.
214
  
Although this approach might seem to protect individual participatory rights, it appears to be 





IV. Proposals and Conclusions  
As the preceding section shows, simply providing plaintiffs with the right to refuse to opt into a 
collective lawsuit does not mean that they will be able to enjoy their individual participatory 
rights in any realistic manner.  While the numerous difficulties identified in this Article could be 
used to justify the conclusion that any kind of cross-border collective relief is impossible within 
the European Union’s legal framework, there are a number of ways to make a cross-border 
collective rights regime workable.  These suggestions fall into three separate categories:  
concerns regarding jurisdiction, concerns regarding enforcement and concerns regarding parallel 
proceedings.  Each is discussed below in turn.   
 
 
                                                          
213
 The power to stay or dismiss an action under article 28 is discretionary, although the better reading of 
the provision appears to suggest that one or the other should be chosen.  See id. art. 28; Strong, Quo 
Vadis, supra note 18; see also supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
214
 There is no apparent cause for objection under the Brussels I Regulation merely because a second suit, 
filed in a court with proper jurisdiction and not involving the same parties and the same cause of action 
under article 27, has won a race to judgment.  See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 27-30, 34-
35.  
215
 See id. art. 15.  However, allowing individual suits to go forward before the collective suit would solve 
a number of problems (such as the diminution of the value of the plaintiff’s claim or the free rider issue), 
particularly if the judgment in any individual suits were not given preclusive value in the collective suit.  




A. Issues regarding jurisdiction 
The first issue to be addressed involves jurisdictional concerns.  Many of the problems 
associated with cross-border collective redress under the Brussels I Regulation relate to the fact 
that collective suits can currently be brought in number of jurisdictions.
216
  This issue could 
easily be addressed by interpreting or amending the Brussels I Regulation to limit the number of 
places where a collective suit can be brought.   
For example, one solution might be to allow collective relief to be sought only in the 
Member State where a majority of the members of the collective are domiciled, rather than in 
any court where jurisdiction is proper under the Brussels I Regulation.
217
  This kind of balancing 
analysis would appear to be proper under the various human rights instruments governing access 
to justice, since the right to a fair trial does not guarantee parties the right to be heard in any 
particular venue.
218
  Furthermore, plaintiffs have long been required to initiate actions in courts 
other than their own under the Brussels I Regulation.
219
 
Of course, this assumes that jurisdiction would be proper under the Brussels I Regulation 
in the place where the majority is domiciled.
220
  Although that would appear likely, given that 
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 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 2-24. 
217
 See id.   
218
 See Fawcett, supra note 28, at 9 (“What Article 6 [of the ECHR] requires is that there is a trial 
somewhere and that this is before a tribunal in accordance with the requirements of Article 6.  It does not 
matter that this trial is abroad.”). 
219
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 2-6.  Although plaintiffs are given the right to sue in 
their own home courts in certain limited circumstances relating to consumer, insurance and employment 
disputes, those provisions tend to focus on the vulnerability of the plaintiffs and the likelihood that the 
claims in question may be relatively small.  See id. arts. 9(1), 16(1), 19(2); see also id. ¶13.  However, 
these concerns are largely based on an access to justice rationale, in that parties are unlikely to assert a 
claim in a foreign court in situations where they are particularly vulnerable or where the transaction costs 
of proceeding in a distant location outweigh the amount in contention.  However, neither of these 
concerns exist in a collective suit, thereby eliminating the need to provide plaintiffs in these kinds of 
claims with (literally) a home court advantage. 
220
 See id. 
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most collective suits would be expected to fall under articles 9, 16 or 19 of the Brussels I 
Regulation, which provide for jurisdiction in the place where the plaintiff  resides or is employed 
in disputes involving consumer, insurance and employment matters,
221
 some provision would 
need to be made to address cases where jurisdiction was not proper in the place where the 
majority was domiciled.   
One solution might be that jurisdiction in those cases might be had in the defendant’s 
domicile.
222
  Although contingency jurisdiction based on the defendant’s domicile would be 
perfectly appropriate, there is always the possibility that the place where jurisdiction over a 
collective suit is proper does not offer collective relief.
223
  Interestingly, the proposed revisions to 
the Brussels I Regulation provide for another sort of contingency jurisdiction that might be 
useful in this regard.
224
  This provision, which appears as proposed article 26, states that: 
[w]here no court of a Member State has jurisdiction under this Regulation, the 
courts of a Member State may, on an exceptional basis, hear the case if the right 
to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so requires, in particular: 
 
(a) if proceedings cannot reasonably be brought or conducted or would be 
impossible in a third State with which the dispute is closely connected; or 
 
(b) if a judgment given on the claim in a third State would not be entitled 
to recognition and enforcement in the Member State of the court seised 
under the law of that State and such recognition and enforcement is 
necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant are satisfied; 
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 See id. arts. 2, 5-6. 
222
 Jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation is always proper in the place where the defendant is 
domiciled.  See id. art. 2. 
223
 Only sixteen Member States currently offer a form of collective relief.  See Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, supra note 4, at 5. 
224
 See Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, art. 26 (as amended). 
225
 Id. art. 26 (as amended). 
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This proposed provision (termed “forum necessitatis”) would be very useful to plaintiffs 
seeking a place to bring a collective claim.
226
  Not only does the text identify one of the 
principles on which collective redress is based (access to justice),
227
 it also contemplates the 
impossibility (or impracticability) of suit in certain Member States, a situation that could arise in 
cases involving collective redress.
228
  This solution also complies with the requirements of article 




Another form of contingency jurisdiction that is identified under the proposed revisions 
to the Brussels I Regulation allows for jurisdiction based on the existence of property within the 
Member State, so long as the value of the claim is “not disproportionate” to the value of the 
property and the dispute has a “sufficient connection” to the Member State in question.230  While 
this provision does not track the needs of collective plaintiffs quite as closely as the first 
proposal, it nevertheless provides a potentially useful alternative.
231
  
A jurisdictional approach that is based primarily or exclusively on the place where a 
majority of the plaintiffs are domiciled is useful in a number of ways, not the least of which is 
the elimination of forum shopping and parallel litigation, at least with respect to collective suits, 
since there is only one location where a majority of the possible plaintiffs can reside.  To some 
extent, caution needs to be taken that any proposals meant to facilitate collective claims do not 
create problems by expanding the number of courts that could exercise jurisdiction over these 
types of claims.  However, the proposed forum necessitatis would not create problems in this 
                                                          
226
 See id. 
227
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶E.   
228
 See Directorate General for Internal Policies, supra note 4, at 5 (noting only sixteen Member States 
currently offer collective relief). 
229
 See Charter, supra note 30, art. 47. 
230
 Brussels I Recast, supra note 4, art. 25 (as amended). 
231
 See id. arts. 25-26 (as amended). 
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regard, since such a forum only arises in the absence of another suitable location.
232
  
Nevertheless, the better approach would be to amend the Brussels I Regulation so that only one 
collective suit may be brought with regard to a particular legal injury. 
While useful, these suggestions only address problems associated with multiple collective 
suits and do not address issues relating to the simultaneous assertion of individual claims.  Under 
the Brussels I regime, courts faced with a single non-participant must consider whether the 
individual suit should be stayed, turned away, or allowed to proceed in parallel with the 
collective suit.
233




B. Issues regarding enforcement 
Concerns about the recognition and enforcement of collective judgments exist at number of 
levels.  Notably, these issues do not relate to the ability of the collective judgment to be 
recognized and enforced under the Brussels I Regulation.
235
  Indeed, the opt-in system 
contemplated by the Resolution is specifically designed so as to avoid problems with recognition 
and enforcement under article 34 of the Regulation.
236
  Instead, difficulties arise because there 
appear to be no standard grounds for refusing enforcement of a collective judgment, not even in 
cases where a non-participant in the first suit has brought a second, related action in another 
Member State, thus raising the possibility of legally irreconcilable judgments.
237
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 See id. art. 26 (as amended). 
233
 Although this analysis has focused on individual claims brought in a place other than the location 
where the collective suit was proceeding, it is theoretically possible for an individual action to be brought 
in the place where the collective suit is pending, unless national law permits for mandatory classes similar 
to that contemplated under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
234
 See infra notes 253-27 and accompanying text. 
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 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16, arts. 33-35. 
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 See id. art. 34(1). 
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 See id. art. 34; see also Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18. 
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This, of course, could be highly problematic, although the extent of the dilemma is 
unclear, given that the failure of the Brussels I Regulation to address matters concerning 
preclusion, combined with the significant degree of national variation concerning claim and issue 
preclusion, means that there is currently no way to predict what preclusive value a judgment 
arising out of a collective suit can or should have in a subsequent individual dispute.
238
  
However, the fact that the Brussels I Regulation contemplates the possibility of irreconcilable 
judgments in several different contexts suggests that a judgment that has been recognized will 
have some preclusive value.
239
 
Some commentators may see this as something of a moot point, at least as a practical 
matter, given the belief that very few plaintiffs will bring an individual action in cases where 
collective redress is available.
240
  However, there is no way to know what will happen in the 
future, since the loser-pays principle may create an incentive for individual plaintiffs to wait until 
a positive judgment has been obtained in one jurisdiction so that they can assert their claims in a 
relatively risk-free environment.
241
   
Going forward, there are a number of steps that need to be taken to resolve problems 
relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments arising out of collective actions.  First 
and foremost, some effort should be made to revise the Brussels I Regulation so as to take issues 
of preclusion into account, at least in the context of collective redress.
242
  While this would 
require a significant rethinking of the instrument, given that it currently focuses only on issues of 
recognition and enforcement, providing some form of guidance to parties would significantly 
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 See id.  
239
 See id. arts. 28, 34. 
240
 Commentators in the United States have remarked on the absence of any empirical data on this point.  
See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 21, at 79.   
241
 See Strong, Quo Vadis, supra note 18; see also supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.  
242
 See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 16. 
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improve collective litigation within the European Union and hence the operation of the single 
market.
243
  Principled and well-considered analysis is particularly important given that this is an 
issue of constitutional importance.
244
   
At this point, no suggestions in this regard have been made in the proposed revisions to 
the Brussels I Regulation.
245
  Instead, the European Commission has explicitly decided not to 
change the procedures currently used for recognition and enforcement of disputes under the 
Brussels I Regulation in cases involving collective redress.
246
  This is in many ways unfortunate, 
since the new provisions on enforcement include a new article, proposed article 46, that could 
have been very useful in cases involving individual participatory rights, since it allows parties to 
resist recognition and enforcement of judgments based on a violation of “the fundamental 
principles underlying the right to a fair trial.
247
 
Problems relating to recognition and enforcement procedures are not limited to 
preclusion issues.
248
  Questions also arise with respect to who is entitled to receive notice of a 
proceeding to recognize or enforce a collective judgment.  Under the Brussels I Regulation, an 
“interested party” can may raise the issue of recognition in an ongoing dispute, apparently as 
either a defensive or offensive tactical maneuver.
249
  An “interested party” can also make an 
                                                          
243
 See Resolution, supra note 5, ¶4. 
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application for enforcement, although the only person to receive notice of that application is 
“[t]he party against whom enforcement is sought,” and then only after the proceedings have 
concluded.
250
   
While the issue of recognition and enforcement will presumably be brought to the 
attention of people like Person A and Person B, who have filed suit prior to the conclusion of the 
collective action and will presumably reinstate those proceedings after the conclusion of the 
collective suit, the question becomes whether Person C – someone who has not yet filed a claim 
but who did not opt into the collective suit – is entitled to any sort of notice regarding recognition 
or enforcement proceedings.  Obviously Person C will want to know, prior to filing, if there is a 
judgment that may be adverse to his or her interests, particularly if that judgment has any 
preclusive value and there is a fee-shifting regime in place, since Person C may otherwise be 
exposed to unnecessary litigation costs.
251
  Furthermore, Person C may want to participate in any 
proceedings to recognize or enforce the collective judgment, particularly if that judgment is to 
have any preclusive effect as to Person C’s claims.  However, there currently appears to be no 
mechanism by which Person C will be notified of recognition or enforcement proceedings, nor 
does Person C have standing to participate in such proceedings under the Brussels I Regulation, 
although there could be some remedy as a matter of national law.
252
  Again, these somewhat 
thorny problems arise because the procedures outlined in the Brussels I Regulation currently 
contemplate a two-party relationship rather than a multiparty one.   
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C. Issues regarding parallel proceedings 
The final topic to consider involves concerns regarding parallel proceedings.  This is one area of 
considerable overlap, since issues relating to preclusion arise in this context to almost the same 
extent that they do in enforcement proceedings. 
One of the key goals of the Brussels I Regulation is the reduction or elimination of 
parallel proceedings.
253
  However, the two primary means by which this goal is accomplished in 
bilateral disputes – staying the second action or dismissing it in favor of an earlier action – are 
highly problematic in the context of collective suits due to the enunciated desire to respect the 
individual participatory rights of parties who have chosen not to proceed in the collective suit.
254
   
Notably, the revisions to the Brussels I Regulation provide no new proposals in how to 
address this issue.
255
  Instead, courts are left with the same options as currently exist under the 
Brussels I Regulation, namely staying a suit or dismissing it in favor of jurisdiction elsewhere.
256
   
The difficulties associated with protecting individual participatory rights in their entirety 
means that a balancing analysis is necessary.
257
  Such an analysis should be guided by article 
52(1) of the Charter, which indicates that any limitation on a fundamental right must “respect the 
essence” of the right in question and that “limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
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and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.”258   
Under this approach, a limitation on individual participatory rights under either of the 
alternatives currently offered under the Brussels I Regulation would seem most appropriate in 
cases where the second action involved claims or defenses that were essentially identical with 
those involved in the collective claim.
259
  In these cases, questions of judicial efficiency and, 
more importantly, respect for the defendant’s rights would appear to allow a minor infringement 
on the plaintiff’s individual participatory rights.260  Indeed, in cases involving dismissal in favor 
of consolidation with a parallel proceeding,
261
 the only real issue is the place where the plaintiff 
is asserting the claim, since the timing has been decided.
262
  Since existing principles of 
European law suggest that a plaintiff’s choice of venue can be overturned in some circumstances, 
denying plaintiffs of their choice of venue in some types of disputes related to collective cases 
does not seem entirely inappropriate.
263
 
However, the analysis changes if the individual suit is in some way different from the 
collective claim.  This scenario could arise in cases where a plaintiff seeks individualized 
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 or wishes to pursue different legal theories than those asserted in the collective 
suit.
265
  Alternatively, it could be the defendant who introduces disparate legal or factual issues 
through the assertion of individualized defenses,
266
 although it may be difficult for a plaintiff to 
anticipate in advance whether a particular defense will be raised.
267
   
Courts and commentators considering cross-border collective suits outside the context of 
the Brussels I Regulation have taken the view that the more distinct the facts or legal issues, the 
less likely and less appropriate it is to give any kind of preclusive value to the first suit.
268
  While 
more consideration of this issue is necessary from a rights perspective, it could be that a similar 
approach is appropriate under the Brussels I Regulation, at least if one considers individual 
participatory rights to include the right to have a judge hear the plaintiff’s facts and legal theories 
on an individualized basis.
269
   
This is not to say that concerns about individualized damages or defenses cannot be 
addressed in a collective suit as a pragmatic matter, since the use of subclasses or bifurcation of 
issues can certainly alleviate many of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ concerns about proceeding 
collectively in the face of certain distinguishing factors.
270
  However, certain plaintiffs may 
decide that they do not want to pursue that sort of generalized relief but instead to proceed 
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  The choice therefore becomes whether to (1) stay the action, based on fairness 
concerns relating to the burden of forcing the defendant to proceed in two (or more) courts at 
once, subject to the proviso that the first judgment will have no preclusive value if the suits are 
sufficiently dissimilar, or (2) allow the second proceeding to go forward, based on concerns 
about the unfairness of a delay to the individual plaintiff, thus forcing the defendant to defend 
itself on multiple fronts simultaneously.
272
   
As with most issues in this area of law, the outcome may depend on the precise facts at 
issue.  Thus, for example, courts might be influenced by the size of the defendant and the nature 
of the second claim.  A large corporate defendant that is used to facing a multitude of small suits 
might be better equipped to handle one more small individual matter than a small to medium 
sized enterprise (SME) that is expending all its energy on the collective suit.   
These are just some of the issues and concerns that arise in the context of the current 
proposal to create a coherent European approach to cross-border collective redress.
273
  
Obviously, there is a great deal more that can and should be said on this subject, particularly with 
respect to the nature of the various rights at stake and the way in which they are weighed against 
each other.
274
  Although this Article has concentrated on plaintiffs’ individual participatory 
rights, defendants also have significant rights that arise as a matter of national and European law.  
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These competing rights and interests must be balanced in a principled and predictable way, 
pursuant to the governing legal standards.
275
   
As difficult as this analysis has been, it is hoped that this discussion will help inspire a 
more robust debate about the fundamental and constitutional nature of various procedural rights 
associated with collective redress in both Europe and the United States.  Cross-border collective 
relief is an issue of increasing importance around the world, and it is incumbent on legislators, 
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